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Exploiting The Artist's Commercial Identity:
The Merchandizing of Art Images
by Jane C. Ginsburg*
INTRODUCTION
"Merchandizing properties" are not a recent arrival on the copyright
and trademark scene. As early as the 1930s, the Walt Disney Company
foresaw the substantial economic gains from licensing the images of its
animated motion picture characters in a variety of consumer media, from
publications, to soft toys, clothing and household items. Most recently,
the World Intellectual Property Organization has prepared a substantial
comparative law study of "Character Merchandising."' The merchandizing of fine arts images, however, is a more recent development, and
is one that has so far received less attention from academic commentators. This article offers some preliminary observations, based primarily
on United States intellectual property law, concerning the copyright and
trademark issues implicated in the merchandizing of images drawn from,
or inspired by, works of leading modern artists, such as Picasso, Dali,
Matisse and Mondrian.
Before undertaking the legal analysis, it is worth briefly surveying the
commercial arena. U.S. newspaper and trade journal reports during the
last year reveal the breadth and significance of art image merchandizing.
For example, shops purveying reproductions of items in the collections
of major U.S. art museums have proliferated in recent years. The
Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City, in addition to its homebased boutique and mail-order business, last year opened a third
Metropolitan Museum of Art shop in the Los Angeles area, and one in
Denver, Colorado. The Museum had already established "16 international
Metropolitan Museum of Art shops in Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong,
Mexico and in various locations throughout Europe."2 The newly-opened
MuseumStore at the new San Francisco Museum of Modern Art was
expected to have $3.8 million in sales during its first year (the store was
to open three months before the museum itselfl); and the four Chicagoarea stores of the Art Institute of Chicago enjoy $10 million in sales

*
Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia
University School of Law, New York. Parts I and II of this article are based on an article
published at 163 Revue Internationale du Droit d'Auteur 3 (January 1995). I thank Justine
Harris, Columbia Law School class of 1996, for research assistance with Part III.
Copyright © 1995 by Jane C. Ginsburg.
1.
INTERNATIONAL BUREAU, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORG., WO/INF/93,
CHARACTER MERCHANDISING (1993).
2.
The Metropolitan Museum of Art Shop to Open in Pasadenaon June 19, 1994, PR
NEWSWIRE, June 13, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, PRNews File.
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annually.3 In 1993, retail sales in the U.S. and Canada from licensing
by museums, contemporary artists and artists' estates totalled $4.74
billion.4
While many of the items - such as reproductions of ancient Egyptian
jewelry, or miniature casts of classical Greek statues - sold in museum
shops and similar emporia are undisputably in the public domain, many
other objects of a merchandizing campaign derive from the work of 20thcentury artists. For example, Chicago's Art Institute purveys an
umbrella "inspired by the surrealist Magritte, [that] is black on the
outside but reveals when open an underside of bright blue sky and a
pattern of clouds."5 The Tampa (Florida) Museum of Art offers "puzzles
of famous art works, including the Bridge at Argenteuil by Monet, for
$12.95. Ties and socks with famous art are $18. Picasso watches are
$40. "6 The Norman Rockwell Museum in Massachusetts proposes 1200
different items - from note cards to trouser suspenders - incorporating
whole or partial images from Rockwell's popular paintings and prints
depicting mid-20th-century American life.7
The subsistence of copyright protection in the original artworks,
together with the burgeoning market for merchandizing properties licensed and counterfeit - raise a variety of legal questions. Some of the
questions concern the identity of the copyright holder in the artwork, a
subject I have addressed in a previous article in this Journal.' For
present purposes, I wish to delineate a continuum of substantive
copyright problems, ranging from the least to the most problematic (I).
The most straightforward copyright issues arise from the full or
substantial reproduction of the image, without the copyright owner's
consent. These issues have both moral and economic dimensions (A). The
more problematic examples involve indirect copying, either in the form
of a derivative variation on the original work, or, more difficult still, a

3.
Gavin Power, Museum Shops In the Spotlight: S.F. MOMA Partof Trend, S.F.
CHRON., Oct. 6, 1994, at El.
4.
ContemporaryArtists Emphasize Gifts, Stationary, THE LICENSING LETTER, Sept.
1994, at 5. (The figure does not include sales of counterfeit merchandise.).
5.
Jay Pridmore, Storing Up Knowledge: Museum Gift Shops Aspire to be More Than
Marketing Ploys, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 3, 1993, at 3.
6.
Michelle Jones, Museum Shop Offers Unique Gifts - On Sale, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Sept. 23, 1994 (Shopping) at 6.
7.
Daniel Grant, The Artwork of Norman Rockwell Preserved on a Pair of
Suspenders, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 12, 1994 (Economy) at 8.
8.
See Jane C. Ginsburg, Conflicts of Copyright Ownership Between Authors and
Owners of OriginalArtworks: An Essay in Comparative and InternationalPrivateLaw, 17
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 395 (1993). See also Determination de la loi applicable e la
titularitL du droit d'auteurentre l'auteurd'une oeuvre d'artet le propridtairede son support,
83 R.C.D.I.P 603 (1994); Droit d'auteuret proprigt6de l'exemplaire d'une oeuvre d'art:4tude
de droit compar6, 46 R.I.D.C. 811 (1994).
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work "inspired by" an artist's overall oeuvre, but copied from none of the
artist's works in particular (B). After exploring the reach, and limitations, of the copyright law in addressing appropriation of an artist's style
and commercial goodwill, I will consider the exent to which the
trademark (unfair competition) law can - or should - fill in the
copyright law's gap (II). Finally, I will examine the proposed application
of trademark remedies in the light of First Amendment concerns (III). I
conclude that the commercial speech doctrine reflects a similar, if
uneasy, distinction between "art" and "commerce," and that the remedies
here proposed should therefore survive First Amendment scrutiny.
I. COPYRIGHT ISSUES: REPRODUCTIONS AND
DERIVATIVE WORKS
A.

CLEAR CASES

The traditional market for art reproductions centered on print uses:
art books, posters and postcards. These uses posed no difficult legal
issues: they involved total or substantial reproductions of the work,
frequently in similar media. In these instances, if the work was still
protected, the copyright owner's authorization was required. Reproduction of the image in other contexts, for example, on t-shirts, linens,
shower curtains and other useful objects, similarly comes within the
copyright owner's purview. Indeed, the U.S. Copyright Act specifies that
"the exclusive right to reproduce a copyrighted pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work ...includes the right to reproduce the work in or on any
kind of article, whether useful or otherwise. " '
In countries that afford strong moral rights protection to authors,
certain kinds of merchandizing of artworks may violate the artist's nonpecuniary right of integrity. A moral rights problem may occur not only
if a reproduction is of particularly poor quality (thus distorting the
work), but if an image, even of good quality, is marketed on articles
inappropriate to the nature of the work or to the artist's personality. For
example, a plausible moral rights claim might arise if the copyright
holder (a person other than the artist) licensed a vegetarian artist's work
to decorate the handles of steak knives.1"
Partial reproductions of an artwork do not pose any special challenge
to the copyright infringement analysis, at least where the reproduction
captures some qualitatively substantial portion of the work. For example,
apposition of the head of one of the Demoiselles d'Avignon on a t-shirt,

9.
17 U.S.C. § 113(a) (1988).
10.
Cf A. LUCAS & H.J. LUCAS, TRAIT9 DE LA PROPRIPT9 LITrRAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE
335-36 & n.280, 280bis (1994) (unauthorized use ofartworks for advertising or pornography
violates moral right of integrity).
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or of one of Matisse's dancers on a dish towel, would clearly require the
copyright owner's permission. Partial reproductions may also provoke
moral rights problems: if the licensor is not the artist, the artist may
object
that the incomplete reproduction of her work violates its integri11
ty.
Adaptations of artworks call into play both the pecuniary derivative
works right, and the moral right of integrity. The U.S. copyright law
defines a "derivative work" as "any . . . form in which a work may be
recast, transformed or adapted."12 Converting a three-dimensional
object to two-dimensional form (for example, a t-shirt depicting a Botero
sculpture, or a postcard of Christo's wrapping of the Pont Neuf), or
changing the color scheme of an image, thus come within the copyright
owner's exclusive right to authorize the creation of derivative works. As
a result, an entrepreneur wishing to purvey, for example, a complete line
of scarves recasting a black and white drawing in every possible color
combination, would have to obtain the copyright owner's permission.
Moreover, in moral rights jurisdictions, if the copyright owner is not the
artist, the entrepreneur should also secure the artist's accord, or else
anticipate a moral rights objection.
B.

HARDER CASES

Other kinds of adaptations of artworks, however, pose more difficult
problems. The derivative works right in general secures to authors the
control not only over their work in its initial form, but over works "based
upon" the initial work.13 Hence, this right enables copyright owners to
license or prohibit the creation of a sequel to a novel, or of a motion
picture based on the novel. But the concept of "based upon" may be more
elusive when applied to works of visual art. The line between infringing
"adaptation" and non-infringing "inspiration" may be difficult to draw.
If the multi-colored scarves posited above would clearly be infringing
derivative works (if unauthorized), what of a more distant variation on
the first artist's theme? What, for example, of a greeting card depicting
(in the same composition and color scheme as the original) dancers
resembling Matisse's, but clothed? Or in lieu of human figures, depicting
dancing animal figures?
A fairly recent case decided by a federal district court in New York
attempts to identify what makes a variation on an artist's theme exceed
the bounds of having been merely "influenced" by the prior work, to
constitute an infringing derivative version of that work. In Steinberg v.

11.
See, e.g. HENRI DESBOIS, LE DRoIT D'AUTEUR EN FRANCE 315 para. 249 (3d ed.
1978) (fragmenting a work of art violates moral rights).
12.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
13.
Id.
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Columbia Pictures Industries,14 plaintiffs work was the well-known
drawing of the city of New York, showing part of the city and the rest of
the world from the myopic perspective of a true New Yorker - that is,
with four blocks of the city's West Side rendered in tremendous detail,
and the rest of the United States, the Pacific Ocean, and Asia receding
in the distance. The drawing initially appeared on the cover of The New
Yorker magazine, and was subsequently, and immensely successfully,
merchandized as a poster. Defendant had adopted the theme of the
Steinberg work for a poster for the film "Moscow on Hudson": this poster
also showed the city and the rest of the world from a myopic perspective,
but this time elaborately depicting four blocks from the city's East Side,
with the Atlantic Ocean and Europe in diminishing detail. The two
posters are shown at pages 6 and 7.
The court held that the defendant had appropriated not only the idea
of depicting New York from a myopic perspective, but also the particular
manner in which Steinberg had rendered this perspective. For example,
defendant selected the same layout of city blocks as had plaintiff, even
though the cross-section plaintiff chose was not representative of most
city blocks. Defendant reproduced many of the ornaments and facades of
the buildings Steinberg depicted, as well as his idiosyncratic play of
shadows, and "childlike, spiky block print." The "Moscow" poster also
appropriated one building "verbatim": the building that appears at the
lower left-hand corner of the Steinberg original reappears at the lower
right center of the "Moscow" version. The court found the appropriation
of an entire building as well as specific architectural detail particularly
telling. Moreover, the architecture of New York's West Side is quite
different from that of its East Side: the recurrence of West Side details
in an East Side setting cannot be explained by a desire to achieve urban
verisimilitude; rather it enhances the impression that defendant copied
more than Steinberg's "idea," it also appropriated Steinberg's particular
expression of the idea.
The court also signalled the "striking stylistic relationship" between
the works, but did not go so far as to say that similarity of style alone
would suffice to constitute copyright infringement. Rather, the court
classified style as "one ingredient of 'expression'," and emphasized the
"right of an artist to protect his choice of perspective and layout in a
drawing, especially in conjunction with the overall concept and individual details." 5 In essence, one may view the "Moscow" poster as a close
paraphrase of the New Yorker poster, and for that reason, well within
the scope of the first artist's derivative work right.

14.
15.

663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
Id. at 712.
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But what if the paraphrase is more distant? Consider these postcards.
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Assuming their producers have not obtained Steinberg's permission,
which, if any, of them would infringe his copyright in the New Yorker
poster?
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Many of the elements of the Steinberg court's analysis might point to
an assessment of infringement with respect to at least certain of these
urban variations. But that conclusion may be troublesome: does it imply
that, having so depicted New York City, Steinberg owns the exclusive
right to render any city from a myopic perspective? Or are we simply
concluding that Steinberg owns the exclusive right to depict any city,
from his particular- and peculiar - myopic perspective? The question
would then be to what extent the post card variations reprise the
individual details of layout and composition, and not simply the overall
theme, of the Steinberg original.
What are the consequences of this analysis for art merchandizing? It
suggests that close imitations of an artist's work, for example, the
clothed Matisse Dancers, would still fall within the artist's copyright. In
these situations, the entrepreneur is seeking to profit by the essence of
the artist's creation (and her reputation), but apparently is also hoping
to introduce sufficient differences to avoid a finding of unlawful
reproduction or adaptation. Unfortunately for the entrepreneur, in
copyright law in general, a difference here or there will not obscure the
essential similarity: "no plagiarist can excuse the wrong by showing how
much of his work he did not pirate.""6
But this quote must remain in context: its author was addressing
appropriations from an identified work. If copyright law accords artists
a substantial zone of derivative works protection around an individual
original expression of a theme, it nonetheless poses an important
limitation: infringement analysis does not address appropriation of
artistic style apart from its expression in a given work. Thus merely to
render a subject "in the style of' an artist, that is, to depict the subject
in the way Picasso, Matisse or Mondrian might have done, but never did,
is not copyright infringement.
Consider the image on the facing page:

16.
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936) (L. Hand,
J.), quoted in Steinberg, 663 F. Supp. at 713.
A related problem concerns the alteration of artworks for purposes of parody. In this
case, the second-comer has also deliberately taken the essence of the first work, but has
introduced differences designed to poke fun at the work (or at what the work has come to
stand for). Marcel Duchamps' "L.H.O.O.Q." is a leading example (an example that itself,
perhaps ironically, has become the object of a variety of merchandizing properties). In U.S.
copyright law, parodies often enjoy the protection of the fair use doctrine. Successful
invocation of the fair use doctrine depends in part on the productiveness, or 'transformative" nature, of defendant's work, and in part on the likelihood that defendant's use will
displace exploitations of the work licenced by the copyright owner. See generally Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164 (1994).
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This is a merchandizing property: a handkerchief highly evocative of
the work of Piet Mondrian, but in fact not derived from any particular
creation of the Dutch artist. The aim of its purveyor is obvious: to reap
the commercial benefits of the popularity and good will of Mondrian,
without having to obtain permission from or pay royalties to the
copyright holder. This is not an obscure or insignificant phenomenon: a
good deal of art merchandizing exploits artists' reputations rather than
individual images drawn from their work. Evocations d'apr~s modern
artists command a substantial market as well.17 If copyright affords no
remedy against this kind of production, can some other legal theory do
the job? Should it?

17.
For example, a recent sales catalogue from the gift shop of New York's Museum
of Modern Art offered "Mir6-Inspired Jewelry." THE MUSEUM OF MODERN ART, NEW YORK,
CATALOGUE 38 (Winter 1994-95).
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II.. TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW:
COVERING THE COMMERCIAL VALUE OF THE
ARTIST'S IDENTITY
Under U.S. trademark law, a distinctive sign need not be registered
to be protected as a trademark. While the Lanham Federal Trademarks
Act' s provides for the registration of trademarks, section 43(a) of that
statute affords proprietors of unregistered marks that have achieved
distinctiveness in the marketplace most of the same remedies as are
available to registered marks. Moreover, this broadly-worded provision
redresses a variety of marketplace misrepresentations concerning the
source or quality of a work, and therefore poses the potential to protect
both an artist's name (discussed below in section A) and, perhaps, her
artistic style (discussed below in section B).
A-

PROTECTING THE ARTIST'S NAME AND SIGNATURE

In the context of artworks, the Trademark Office has accepted an
artist's name for registration as a trademark for original works of art. 9
Even without registration, artists have developed distinctive logos to
promote the merchandizing of their works,2" and have endeavored to
enforce rights in their names and signatures against unlicensed uses. For
example, a collective licensing society representing the Picasso heirs in
New York obtained temporary restraining and seizure orders from
federal court against unlicensed vendors of t-shirts bearing the Picasso
name and signature.2
Not all artists' names may be perceived as trademarks for the goods
on which their names or images are merchandized. It is important to
distinguish between the use of the artist's name to identify the creator
of the image depicted on the t-shirt or other merchandizing property on
the one hand, and the use of the name to denote, or suggest, that the
goods are made with the sponsorship or approval of the artist (or her
heirs) on the other. Only the latter is a trademark use.22 In the case of
Picasso, the heirs were able to restrain the manufacture and sale of
unlicensed t-shirts because during his lifetime the artist had already
embarked on a program of licensing his name and signature for a variety

18.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), amended by Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (amending §§ 1052 and 1127).
19.
In re Wood, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1345 (T.T.A.B. 1983).
20.
See WILLIAM M. BORCHARD, TRADEMARKS AND THE ARTS 50 (1989).
21.
See Tim Jensen, The Selling of Picasso:A Look at the Artist's Rights in Protecting
the Reputation of His Name, VI ART & THE LAW 77 (1981).
22.
See, e.g., Hughes v. Design Look, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 1500 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(distinction between identification of Andy Warhol as source of images depicted on
calendars, and of trademark-invoking plaintiffs as the source of the calendars).
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of products, including ceramics, carpeting and dishware. After his death,
his heirs perpetuated and expanded the licensing program into a broad
range of clothing, paper goods and household products.2 3 As a result,
Picasso's name and signature symbolized not only the source of the
original artworks, but also of the merchandizing properties derived from
them.
This does not mean that the trademark law holds no interest for
artists who have not already merchandized images from their works. An
artist who anticipates a merchandizing program should register her'
name as a trademark for the original artworks, and, at the very least, for
paper goods (since even very modest art promotions can at least involve
postcards or other paper reproductions). Moreover, even if the artist has
not promoted her name as a trademark for merchandizing properties, she
may be able to invoke Section 43(a) against use of her name to identify
images she did not in fact create. For example, suppose an entrepreneur
sells posters, clothing, and table linens depicting deformed, dripping
watches, and bearing a facsimile of Salvador Dali's signature. The
watches, albeit reminiscent of the Dali style, correspond to no images
Dali in fact produced. Dali's name is therefore being attributed to a work
he did not create. Or consider a merchandizing item bearing a representation of a work the artist did create, but whose appearance (for
example, colors or proportions) has been altered by the entrepreneur. In
these instances, the theory of the claim is not necessarily that the public
will be confused as to the source or sponsorship of the goods (since the
public may have no expectation that the artist is licensing or otherwise
connected with the merchandizing program). Rather, the theory of the
claim is that the purveying of the goods constitutes "commercial
advertising or promotion [that] misrepresents the nature, characteristics
[or] qualities" of the goods.24 In other words, the goods are being falsely
represented as depicting works by the named artist; this is a kind of
false advertising actionable both under the federal trademarks law, and
under state trademarks and unfair competition laws.25
But suppose the entrepreneur of the dripping watches, rather than
affixing a facsimile of Dali's signature, instead markets the goods as
"d'apr~s Dali." Once the goods are accurately labelled, does the artist
have any remedy? Will the trademarks and unfair competition law
protect against usurpation of the artist's style, as well as of her name?

23.
Jensen, supra note 21, at 78.
24.
15 U.S.C. § 112 5(a)(2) [§ 43(a)(2) of the Lanham Act].
25.
See, e.g., UNIF. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT § 2, 7A U.L.A. 277 (1994); N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(a) (McKinney 1995).

14

COLUMBiA-VLA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS

[19:1

B. PROTECTING THE ARTIST'S STYLE?

A recent federal trial court decision has prompted speculation
as to the
ability of the Lanham Act to protect an artist's visual style,
or "trade
dress." In Romm Art v. Simcha International,
26
plaintiff, a publisher

26.

786 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).

1994-51

MERCHANDIZING OF ART IMAGES

15

of posters of the works of the Israeli artist Tarkay, charged that
defendant was publishing posters by an artist named Patricia, that
imitated the visual style of Tarkay's "Women and Cafes" series of
posters. The Tarkay and Patricia posters did indeed both portray in a
similar fashion women seated in a variety of caf6s.
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Rather than bringing a copyright infringement claim, Tarkay's
publisher initiated a trade dress infringement action, alleging that the
stylistic similarities in the works would lead consumers to believe that
the Patricia posters were Tarkays. The court found a likelihood of such
consumer confusion, based largely on its observation that the two sets of
posters conveyed "the same overall impression,"27 and its perception
that Patricia's publisher had the "intention of capitalizing on the
plaintiffs reputation and goodwill and any confusion between his and
[plaintiffs] product."28 The practice of some galleries of cropping,
matting or placing frames around the Patricia posters in such a way as
to obscure her name, further supported the court's determination of
likelihood of confusion.
The Romm Art decision has drawn mixed reactions from commentators
in the U.S.29 As applied to the fine arts themselves, the decision seems
troublesome: many artists' styles owe a great deal to their predecessors.
The Tarkay "look" itself strongly resembles a Matisse crossed with a
Modigliani. One would nonetheless be reluctant to suggest that either of
these artists' heirs should be able to enjoin the dissemination of Tarkay's
work, or that Tarkay should pay them royalties.
On the other hand, there may be a difference between emulation of
another's artistic style in the development of one's own pictorial
expression, and the commercial appropriation of an artist's identity,
particularly in the context of merchandizing properties. It is one thing
for Tarkay to be inspired by Matisse; it is another for him to pass his
own work off as being by Matisse. That distinction also emerges from the
Romm Art decision: if galleries were selling Patricia posters with her
name conveniently cut off, that would promote the impression that the
posters were Tarkays. Passing off can be implicit as well as explicit. This
brings us back to the Mondrian-like handkerchief. As the photograph
shows, it does not bear Mondrian's name or signature. On the other
hand, it does not disclaim Mondrian's authorship either. As a result, its
strong stylistic similarity with Mondrian's work may lead consumers to
believe that the article is "a Mondrian" and not simply "inspired by
Mondrian." The producer of this item attracts public attention, and
perhaps incites the public to purchase, because of the item's obvious

27.
Id. at 1137.
28.
Id. at 1139.
29.
Compare Michelle Brownlee, Note, Safeguarding Style: What Protection is
Afforded to Visual Artists by the Copyright and Trademark Laws?, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1157
(1993) (endorsing use of the copyright and trademark laws to protect artistic style) with
William P.Fitzpatrick. Note, The Hazardsof Extending Copyrightor Trademark Protection
to an Artist's Visual Style, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 453 (1993) (criticizing Romm Art
and expressing concern that copyright or trademark protection of artistic style will frustrate
creativity, particularly by those artists that build upon the work of their predecessors).
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resemblance to the works of Mondrian. The producer is thus profiting
from the artist's good will.
However, seeking to profit by another's good will is not necessarily the
same thing as misleading consumers as to the nature or sponsorship of
the goods. If the goods are clearly labelled as d'apr~s or "inspired by" or
even hommage e the targeted artist, the producer will claim that there
can be no actionable misrepresentation. Trademark decisions involving
different kinds of commercial ventures suggest two responses.
First, despite the disclaimer, the first impression the consumer
receives may well be that the item is a Mondrian, Dali, etc., and that
may be enough to stimulate the purchasing decision. Subsequent
examination of the goods and discovery of their true nature may not
completely dispel the favorable impression generated by the initial
association with the artist's "real" output. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit applied this theory of consumer confusion
in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp.3 ° In that case, defendant,
an oil trader, having named its company "Pegasus Petroleum," attracted
a trademark infringement suit by Mobil Oil, whose famous logo depicts
a flying horse. In addition to its industrial and general consumer sales
of petroleum, Mobil is engaged in the oil trading market. However, it
does not use its flying horse symbol in connection with its oil trading
business. Pegasus Petroleum does not depict the flying horse as part of
its trade symbols. Pegasus contended that these facts, as well as the
small size and sophistication of the oil trading market, eliminated any
likelihood of confusion between it and Mobil. The court nonetheless held
for Mobil, in part on the ground that the Pegasus name would evoke
favorable, if perhaps subliminal, associations with Mobil. The court
"found a likelihood of confusion not in the fact that a third party would
do business with Pegasus Petroleum believing it related to Mobil, but
rather in the likelihood that Pegasus Petroleum would gain crucial
credibility during the initial phases of a deal."3' In other words, even
were confusion soon dispelled, the second-comer would have nudged its
foot into the door on the strength of the other's reputation." The Second
Circuit's decision thus supports the argument that even truthfully
labelled goods may cause confusion if their initial commercial appeal
stems from the original artist's good will.

30.
818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987).
31.
Id. at 259. The court continued: "For example, an oil trader might listen to a cold
phone call from Pegasus Petroleum . . . when otherwise he might not, because of the
possibility that Pegasus Petroleum is related to Mobil." Id.
32.
Accord Koppers Co. v. Krupp-Koppers, GmbH, 517 F. Supp. 836, 844 (W.D. Pa.
1981) ("securing the initial business contact by defendant because of an assumed
association between the parties is wrongful even though the mistake is later rectified.")
(citing Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331
(2d Cir. 1975)).
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Another theory elaborated in the Second Circuit offers a second
response to the claim that a d'apr~s label suffices to insulate the
merchandizer from charges of confusion. This theory addresses the
potential audience for the goods. In this view, the direct consumer is not
the only relevant subject of confusion. There may be a secondary market
whose misimpressions will not be corrected by disclaiming labelling,
since these persons will not encounter the labels. Thus, for example, once
the truthfully-labelled imitation jeans are off the rack, and on the
wearer, little if anything distinguishes them from the "real thing." The
Second Circuit has applied the theory of "secondary confusion" to
condemn a variety of "knock off" goods, from imitation designer clocks to
ersatz Levi's jeans.33 In these cases, the court's perception that the
second-comer seeks "to reap financial benefits from poaching on the
reputation"' of the market leader probably underlies the theory of postsale confusion."5
The secondary confusion approach thus indicates that even the
"d'apr~s" goods may be found in violation of the trademark and unfair
competition laws, particularly if their purchasers are likely to display
them in a way that hides or removes the disclaimer. But the secondary
confusion doctrine has not been accepted by all U.S. federal courts.3 6 It
is therefore uncertain how successful (and where) this approach to
combatting the commercial exploitation of artistic good will would be.
Moreover, even where the doctrine has been accepted, or where courts
subsribe to the "foot in the door" theory of confusion," it remains to be
seen whether imposition of liability for commercial imitation of artistic
style is consistent with the First Amendment.

33.
See, e.g., Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre
Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1955); Lois Sportswear U.S.A. Inc. v. Levi Strauss &
Co., 799 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1986).
34.
Mastercrafters, 221 F.2d at 466.
35.
The theory of secondary confusion, and the moral judgment it implies, also
characterize the trademark anticounterfeiting laws, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1116-18; 18 U.S.C. § 2320
(1988). There, courts have repeatedly held that acts such as selling $10.00 "Rolex" watches
violate those texts' confusion standards, even though no rational buyer could possibly
believe that an item so priced would be a "real" Rolex. See, e.g., United States v.
Torkington, 812 F.2d 1347 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Gantos, 817 F.2d 41 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 860 (1987).
36.
See, e.g., Smith v. Chanel, 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968) (rejecting trademark
infringement claim brought against purveyor of imitation "Chanel #5").
37.
See, e.g., Foxworthy v. Custom Tees, Inc., No. 1:94-CV-3477-RCF, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3901, at *43-44 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 6, 1995).
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III. FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF TRADEMARK
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION THEORIES OF LIABILITY
The first question one might ask is: What speech interests are at issue
in the marketing of Picasso-esque coffee mugs, Mondrian-like towelettes
or Matisse-inspired t-shirts? 8 Because the theories of liability reviewed
above would reach only commercial mass market exploitation, those
artists who build on, distort, parody or simply "appropriate" other artists'
images should remain free to do so, in the context and confines of the art
market.39 As a result, trademark and unfair competition liability should
not threaten artistic expression. Rather, what these theories of liability
address is the "sale," not any "statement."
Nonetheless, the substantial First Amendment "commercial speech"
case law protects communicative commercial transactions, so long as the
commercial speech is truthful and not misleading.4" Here, however, the
premise is that the sale of imitation art images is (or can be) misleading,
under the unfair competition theories developed above. Unlike political
speech which is not subject to a truth test, 41 speech that "propose[s] a
commercial transaction" is subject to government prohibition if it is false
or misleading.42 Thus, if the sale of merchandizing properties bearing
imitation art images is misleading as to the nature of the images or
sponsorship of the goods, then the artist's (or her successors') invocation
of the trademark and unfair competition laws to enjoin the sale should
not violate the First Amendment.

38.
Cf. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 2d 813,851 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting)
("Plaintiffs challenged Universal's licensing of Lugosi's likeness in his portrayal of Count
Dracula in connection with the sale of such objects as plastic toy pencil sharpeners, soap
products, target games, candy dispensers and beverage stirring rods. Such conduct hardly
implicates the First Amendment.")
39.
Cf.John Carlin, Culture Vultures:ArtisticAppropriationand Intellectual Property
Law, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 103 (1988); E. Kenly Ames, Note, Beyond Rogers v.
Koons: A FairUse Standardfor Appropriation,93 COLUM. L. REV. 1473 (1993) (addressing
copyright liability for art appropriation, and contending that artists should be permitted
to appropriate in the creation of originals or limited editions, but should not be authorized
to mass market the appropriated images).
40. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980); Virginia State Bd. Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
41.
See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (Ku Klux Klan rally
denouncing blacks).
42. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983). For an unfair
competition law decision distinguishing protected scholarly speech from misleading
commercial solicitation, see Gordon & Breach Science Pubs. v. American Inst. of Physics,
859 F. Supp. 1521 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
The case law distinction of highly protected political or social speech from weakly
protected commercial speech has provoked academic challenge. See, e.g., Ronald Collins &
David Skover, Commerce and Communication, 71 TEx. L. REV. 697 (1993); Alex Kozinski
& Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627 (1990).
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However, one might contend that the sale is not merely a commercial
transaction, it is primarily a social "statement." That is, the appropriartion or imitation of famous art images on common mass market articles
"says something" about art and its "commodification," about the death of
originality, about the toppling of artistic icons, the levelling of cultural
signs. Just as Warhol's consecration of the Campbell's soup can to a
canvass elevated the mundane to the art sphere, so a Dali-esque dripping
watch on a shower curtain lowers high art and confuses the artistic with
the everyday.43 As a result, the commercial aspects of the speech are
"inextricably intertwined" with a social and artistic message; the
regulation of the sale should therefore be subject to a more stringent
level of First Amendment scrutiny."
There are at least two problems with this argument. The first concerns
the purveyor of the merchandise. Were the merchandiser the artist, there
would be a connection between the sale and artistic expression.4"
Where, however, the seller is simply a retailer or wholesaler, the claim
to artistic expression is much attenuated. Selling art, or art imitations,
does not make the salesman an artist. Courts should be capable of telling
the difference between a sculptor and a retailer.
The second problem with the argument is that, even if courts were
reluctant to declare the purveyor the wrong party in interest, the
"commercial" and "pure speech" aspects of affixing fine-art images or
imitations on everyday articles are not "inextricably interwined."" The
art world itself does not hesitate to draw the distinction. The practice in
the art world divides "art" from "merchandise." This is true even with
respect to modern artists who challenge the intellectual distinction
between the ordinary and the artistic. While these artists' work seeks to
blur the line between art and commerce, the context in which they
exhibit and sell their creations is clearly, and consciously, artistic. Hence,
for example, artist Jeff Koons has argued that his appropriation of

43.

Cf. JANE GAINES, CONTESTED CULTURE: THE IMAGE, THE VOICE AND THE LAW 202-

03 (1991) (equating "the right to speak" with "the right to manufacture in bulk").
44.
See, e.g., Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988)
(invalidating disclosure requirement for charitable solicitations).
45.
Cf. Gaudiya Vaishnava Soc'y v. San Francisco, 900 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 1990)
(religious, environmental, and other non-profit organizations brought successful challenge
to ordinance prohibiting the organizations from selling on the street without a permit tshirts, stuffed animals and other merchandise bearing the organizations' religious,
environmental or political messages). See also One World Family Now v. City of Key West,
852 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D. Fla. 1994); One World Family Now v. Nevada, 860 F. Supp. 1457
(D. Nev. 1994) (sale of "expressive t-shirts" by non-profit "spiritual ecology" organization;
following Gaudiya).
46.
Cf. Board of Trustees, SUNY v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (possible to distinguish
educational messages about home economics from sales pitch for housewares).
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images from comic stips should be excused as fair use art speech because
he made only four copies of the work.47
This anomaly has not escaped the cultural critics' notice; discussing
the work of Sherrie Levine, Jane Gaines has observed:
Generally critics have understood Levine's work, in which she rephotographs and remounts Walker Evans's and Edward Weston's photographic
classics, as a reconsideration of authenticity and a direct challenge to
existing copyrights in these works. But Levine's work is also a testament
to the inevitability of generic borrowing, to the possibility of the total
exhaustion of signs and the consequent impossibility of producing anything
entirely new ....
And yet [Levine's work] works its subversion primarily
within the privileged space of the museum, where unauthorized borrowing
can always be defined as parody or critical comment. To pose real trouble
for the "author" in copyright doctrine, Sherrie Levine would have to
reproduce her own copies of Edward Weston as postcards and then sell
them - the stiffest test of "free commercial speech.""
To the art trade, the difference between "art" and "merchandise" turns
on the way the article is sold. "Art" is produced in originals or limited
editions, and is sold at high prices in galleries. "Merchandise" is mass
produced, sells in retail outlets, frequently at a low price.49 Owning the
merchandised art image is accessible to everybody; owning the art
original is not.
Thus, suppose a Matisse-inspired design on a wastebasket. One may
imagine that the conjunction of the design and the item makes a
statement about the use and worth of the kind of not-so-modern art that
is today widely acceptable to the middle class. Where the context of the
item's sale or exhibition remains within the "art" world, that may suffice
to insulate the borrowing or imitation of the image from challenge under
the intellectual property laws (or, at least, under trademark and unfair
competition laws). But where the context is more clearly mass commercial, the item's affinities with "merchandise" dominate; any "speech"
elements of the sale should be considered within the realm of "commercial speech," and thus, if misleading, vulnerable to legal prohibition. 0

47.
See United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(sculpture incorporating character from "Garfield" comic strip). See also Rogers v. Koons,
960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365 (1992) (four copies of sculpture based on
photograph); Campbell v. Koons, No. 91 Civ. 6055 (RO), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3957
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1993) (four copies of sculpture based on photograph).
48.
GAINES, supra note 43, at 236.
49.
Interview with Hillary Richardson, licensing agent for the Andy Warhol
Foundation (Feb. 13, 1995).
50.
The limitation of the artist's rights to claims against misleading imitations of her
work should safeguard commercial art parodies. Suppose, for example, a t-shirt bearing a
representation of a Dali-esque dripping watch, with a distorted portrait of Newt Gingrich
on the watchface. Where the consumer recognizes the reference to a prior artwork, but also
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CONCLUSION
Reviewing the copyright, trademarks and unfair competition, and First
Amendment analyses, one may advance the following conclusions
regarding merchandizing properties based on the works or the commercial identity of fine artists:
1. Unlicensed goods that incorporate or alter all or substantial
portions of a work still under copyright infringe the copyright
owner's exclusive rights to reproduce the work in copies and to
create derivative works. In certain jurisdictions some of these
practices may also violate the artist's moral right of integrity.
2. Goods incorporating images based on prior works of the artist
may infringe the derivative works right, depending on how closely
the goods reprise the prior work's particular expression, as opposed
to evoking or varying the work's "idea."
3. With respect to goods depicting images "inspired" but not created
by an artist, explicitly or implicitly passing off merchandizing
properties in the style of an artist as being by the artist may violate
trademark and unfair competition laws, whether or not the artist
has registered her name or signature as a trademark.
4. Labelling such goods as "inspired by," "d'apr~s," etc. may not
adequately dispel the confusion generated by the consumer's initial
contact with an item that appears to have been based on the artist's
actual work; moreover, even if the consumer is not deceived, the
possibility of post-sale confusion remains. The success of this kind
of claim may well depend on how much moral opprobrium the court
attaches to "poaching on the [artist's] reputation."
5. Concern for artistic freedom requires limiting claims to protect
artistic style to the context of misleading commercial exploitation,
particularly of merchandizing properties.

recognizes that the work is the target of or a vehicle for a satire (commercial or "artistic"),
then the sale of the parody, albeit "commercial speech" should receive First Amendment
protection.

